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SPOUSAL NOTIFICATION AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Scheinberg v. Smith
659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981)
MEERA WERTH, 1984*
Regulation and administration of family law has traditionally
been considered within the purview of state control.I For example, the
age at which individuals may contract to marry and the acts which con-
stitute grounds for divorce have always been regarded as matters of
local rather than national concern. 2 However, the states' power to in-
tervene in domestic relations is not free from constitutional restraints.
Where a state law infringes on fundamental human rights, it is subject
to close judicial scrutiny which may result in the law being struck down
if challenged on constitutional grounds. 3 Thus, an important part of
the analysis in deciding the constitutionality of a state law is the deter-
mination of which rights are to be considered fundamental. There is
no simple formula for making this determination. In deciding whether
a fundamental right is at stake, the Supreme Court has frequently
turned to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people."'4
In 1965, the Court recognized the right of privacy as a fundamen-
tal right.5 Less than a decade later, in Roe v. Wade,6 the Court reaf-
firmed the right of privacy as fundamental and held that this right
encompassed a woman's decision to obtain an abortion. Consequently,
since the holding in Roe v. Wade, any state regulation interfering with
a woman's decision to obtain an abortion is subject to strict scrutiny.
Under this mode of review, once the litigant has shown that a state
* B.A., University of New Delhi, 1972; Candidate for J.D., lIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law, 1984.
1. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
2. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). The states' power to regulate family relationships
stems from two sources, the police power and theparenspatriae power. For a discussion on the
sources of these powers see Note, Developments in the Law, The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1198-1242 (1980).
3. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (involving the fundamental right of privacy);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (involving the fundamental right to interstate travel).
4. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). See note 13 infra for examples of personal
rights which the Court has recognized as fundamental.
5. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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statute poses some restriction on a fundamental right, the state is re-
quired to demonstrate that a compelling interest is served by the statute
which justifies such interference. 7 The types of state regulations that
constitute a restriction on a woman's decision to obtain an abortion and
the types of governmental interests that are to be considered compel-
ling continue to be a source of debate and litigation.
In Scheinberg v. Smith ,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was confronted with the problem of determining whether
a Florida statute9 requiring a woman to notify her husband of her deci-
sion to terminate her pregnancy was unconstitutional in light of the
asserted state interests. The Scheinberg court held that the state's inter-
ests in protecting the husband's interest in the procreative potential of
his marriage and in promoting marital integrity were sufficiently com-
pelling to justify the burden imposed upon a woman by the notification
statute.10 The court remanded the case, stating that if the lower court
should find that an abortion has an adverse effect upon a woman's fu-
ture procreative potential, thereby affecting the procreative potential of
the marriage, the state can require spousal notification prior to the
abortion." 1
This case comment will first briefly examine the nature and history
of the right of privacy which protects a woman's decision to obtain an
abortion free of unjustifiable state intrusions. Next, the analysis section
will consider the impact of important Supreme Court decisions in this
area and show that these decisions do not support the Scheinberg
court's reasoning. Finally, the comment will discuss the resulting
weakness in the Scheinberg court's rationale and assess the potential
impact and the desirability of the Scheinberg decision.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Right of Privacy in Abortion Cases
In order to understand and evaluate the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Scheinberg v. Smith, it is essential to trace the emergence of the right of
privacy and its application to the abortion cases.
7. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The strict scrutiny analysis is discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 27-31.
8. 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981).
9. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(b) (West 1981) (previously codified under the Medical
Practice Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.505(4)(b) (West 1979)).
10. 659 F.2d at 483.
11. Id. at 487.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The general nature of the right of privacy' 2 is freedom from un-
warranted state interference with the personal affairs and decisions of
an individual.' 3 Although several earlier cases had indicated that there
is a general right which protects certain private decisions and activities
from state intrusion,' 4 the right of privacy was not explicitly recognized
by the Supreme Court until 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut.' Even
though the right of privacy is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution,
the majority in Griswold firmly established the existence of such a right.
The Justices disagreed, however, as to the constitutional source of the
right. Justice Douglas' plurality opinion found this right in the
"penumbras" surrounding the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth
amendments which created a zone of privacy. Justice Goldberg, joined
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, found the right of pri-
vacy to stem from the ninth amendment, while Justice Harlan relied on
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as the source of
this right.
Having recognized the right of privacy as a fundamental right, the
Griswold court invalidated a Connecticut statute which prohibited the
use of contraceptives by married couples. Finding the statute to be an
impermissible encroachment upon a married couple's personal procre-
ative decisions, the Court stated that such state intrusion into funda-
mental personal liberties was justified only when necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest.' 6
The Supreme Court's focus in Griswold on the private nature of
12. The right of privacy also exists in the common law tort context. See W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 802-18 (4th ed. 1971). This comment deals only with the constitutionally protected
right of privacy. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court explained which personal decisions are
protected by the right of privacy: "[oinly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.
Such personal rights include decisions and activities relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, and child rearing and education." Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
The determination by the Court as to which rights are "fundamental" and therefore worthy of
constitutional protection is necessarily a subjective one. Consequently, critics have attacked the
recent Supreme Court decisions regarding privacy rights as a return to the Lochner era. See infra,
note 22.
14. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (contracep-
tives); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401
(1923) (child-rearing).
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. Id. at 504. The two-part test used in scrutinizing legislation which impinges upon funda-
mental rights is discussed in text accompanying notes 27-31 infra. Compare this approach to the
deferential "hands-off" approach adopted in the 1930's for scrutinizing economic legislation in
which the Court upheld laws on the basis of mere rationality. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934). See infra, note 22.
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marital relationships' 7 appeared to narrow the scope of the right of pri-
vacy to the matrimonial arena. Seven years later, however, in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird,'8 the Court declared that this right affords similar
protection on equal protection grounds to unmarried persons.' 9
In its landmark decision of Roe v. Wade,20 the Supreme Court
once again touched upon the source of the right of privacy. Writing for
the majority, Justice Blackmun placed the source of this right in the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2' The invocation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Roe marks a
return to the substantive due process approach originally used in the
early part of the twentieth century. 22 Under this doctrine of substantive
due process, any legislation which limits life, liberty or property 23 is
subject to judicial reevaluation. Although this approach became dis-
credited in the area of economic legislation, 24 it has been reinstated in
recent years as a means of protecting non-economic, personal values. 25
Roe v. Wade and its progeny have established the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment as the source of the right of privacy in abor-
tion cases.
In Roe, the Court held that the right of privacy is broad enough to
encompass an unmarried woman's decision to terminate her preg-
nancy. 26 Noting that a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is
a fundamental right, the Court articulated a two-part test which a state
17. Justice Douglas expressed concern about allowing "the police to search the sacred pre-
cincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives." 381 U.S. at 485.
18. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
19. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated: "If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). These remarks by Justice Brennan proved significant as
they were later relied on in Roe v. Wade.
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Id. at 153.
22. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In such cases, the Court applied
strict scrutiny to economic regulations, arguing that the fourteenth amendment's protection im-
plicitly granted a fundamental substantive right to economic freedom. This approach became
discredited because of the discretion and subjectivism it allowed the Court to inject into every
decision, and was abandoned during the 1930's in favor of a presumption of validity in economic
regulations. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The substantive due process
doctrine has reemerged in the right of privacy context and has once again been subject to criti-
cism. Like the right to enter into a contract, upheld in Lochner, abortion is nowhere mentioned
explicitly in the Constitution. By finding such unwritten rights to exist in the Constitution, the
Justices were reverting back to the Lochner era. See generally Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
23. See U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
24. See note 22 supra.
25. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
26. 410 U.S. at 153.
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is required to meet in order to justify statutory intrusions impinging
upon that right. First, the state must show that the statute serves a
compelling state interest 27 and, second, it must demonstrate that the
statute is drafted so as to achieve only the state's interest at stake. 28
This language indicates that strict scrutiny is the standard of review in
abortion cases. 29 Under this standard of review, once the challenger of
the state law has shown that the law imposes some restriction on a fun-
damental right, the burden shifts to the state to meet the two-part test. 30
The first part involves a showing by the state that the state law imping-
ing upon an individual's fundamental right serves such a vital govern-
mental interest as to justify the interference with the right. However,
the showing of a compelling governmental interest alone is not suffi-
cient to render all state regulation valid. The second part of the two-
part test requires the state to demonstrate that the regulation is nar-
rowly drafted to serve only the interest sought to be achieved by the
state. Thus, even a legitimate and substantial governmental purpose
"cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 3'
In Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized two compelling state inter-
ests in regulating abortion. First, the state has a legitimate interest in
preserving the mother's health.32 The Court found this interest to be-
come compelling at approximately the end of the first trimester of preg-
nancy because prior to this point the "mortality in abortion may be less
than mortality in normal childbirth. ' 33 Consequently, after the first tri-
mester, the state's interest in preserving maternal health allows some
health-related regulation of the abortion procedure. 34
27. Id. at 155.
28. Id.
29. Strict scrutiny is traditionally employed where fundamental rights are the target of state
legislation. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
30. The challenger of the state law need not show that the law imposes an absolute obstacle
to the exercise of the fundamental right. A mere showing of some restriction on the right is suffi-
cient to trigger strict scrutiny. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155 (1973).
31. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
32. 410 U.S. at 162.
33. Id. at 163. One commentator has noted that as medical technology advances, the mortal-
ity rate of abortions performed after the first trimester may decline, thus making the point at
which the state's interest in maternal health becomes compelling arise at a later stage in the preg-
nancy. Tietz, New Estimates ofJMortality Associated with Fertility Control, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSPEC-
TIVES 74 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194-95 (1973) (allowing licensing standards for
facilities where abortion would be performed after the first trimester of pregnancy provided that
the standards are related to the preservation of maternal health and do not unnecessarily limit
performance of abortions to hospitals).
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The second compelling state interest recognized by the Roe Court
was in preserving the life of a viable fetus.3" Viability was defined as
the point in time at which the fetus is "potentially able to live outside
the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." 36 At this point, thought
to occur during the third trimester of pregnancy, the state could regu-
late.and even proscribe abortion except when necessary to preserve the
health or life of the mother.37
In the companion case to Roe, Doe v. Bolton,38 the Court struck
down certain procedural requirements of the Georgia abortion stat-
ute.39 This statute required that: 1) the woman seeking the abortion
must be a resident of Georgia; 2) the abortion must be approved by a
hospital committee; 3) the abortion must be performed in an accredited
hospital; and 4) the judgment of the physician performing the abortion
must be confirmed by two other physicians. Although these require-
ments did not prohibit abortion outright, they had the effect of restrict-
ing free access to abortions, a restriction which the Court had found
impermissible in the first trimester of pregnancy. As a result, each of
the requirements was found unconstitutional in whole or in part. 4°
The Griswold-Roe line of cases have established a right of procrea-
tive autonomy by recognizing a right to prevent procreation through
contraception 4' and a right to terminate procreation through abor-
tion.42 However, the right of procreative autonomy had been upheld
by the Supreme Court as early as 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma ,43 where
35. 410 U.S. at 163.
36. Id. at 160. The point at which viability occurs was left flexible for anticipated advance-
ments in medical skill and judgment. In Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 64 (1976) and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979), the Court reiterated the need for
this flexibility.
37. Commentators have noted that as medical advancement is made, the chances of survival
outside the womb for less developed fetuses will increase. This could provide a basis for state
intrusion into a woman's abortion decision at an earlier stage of pregnancy. See Horan, Viability,
Values, and the Vast Cosmos, 22 CATH. LAw 1, 26-27 (1976). Indeed, medical progress may virtu-
ally eliminate all abortions if the fetus is able to survive outside the womb after the first month of
pregnancy.
38. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
39. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1201 through 26-1203 (1971).
40. The residency requirement was found to violate the privileges and immunities clause.
410 U.S. at 200. The requirements of a hospital committee approval and confirmation by two
other physicians were held to be unduly restrictive. Id. at 199. The requirement that the abortion
be performed in an accredited hospital was struck down because it failed to exclude first trimester
abortions and the state had "not presented persuasive data to show that only hospitals meet its
acknowledged interest in insuring the quality of the operation and the full protection of the pa-
tient." Id. at 195.
41. See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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the Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute that allowed compulsory
sterilization of certain convicted criminals. The Skinner Court stated
that "marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race.""4 The Griswold-Roe line of cases reaffirmed
and strengthened the concept of autonomy by allowing an individual
not only the freedom of procreation but also the choice of preventing or
terminating procreation free from state intrusions.
The decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton left certain impor-
tant issues unresolved. For example, the Court expressly did not de-
cide whether a state may protect the husband's interest in his wife's
abortion by requiring a woman to obtain his consent prior to an abor-
tion.45 Neither did the Court address the constitutionality of parental
consent requirements in the case of unmarried minors seeking abor-
tions. Proponents of anti-abortion laws employed these omissions by
the Supreme Court to pass legislation curtailing the availability of
abortions." States began to enact legislation requiring spousal or pa-
rental consent before a woman could obtain an abortion.47
Consent Requirements
In the years following the Roe decision, several lower federal
courts were confronted with the issue of the constitutionality of spousal
consent requirements. 48  Challenges to these state requirements were
made on the grounds that such interference by the state in the first tri-
mester of pregnancy violated the standards established by Roe v.
Wade .49
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,5° the
44. Id. at 541. Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) in which the Supreme Court upheld a
Virginia statute providing for sterilization of inmates afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity or
imbecility.
45. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court stated: "Neither, in this opinion
nor in Doe v. Bolton . . .do we discuss the father's rights, if any exist in the constitutional con-
text, in the abortion decision. No paternal rights have been asserted in either of the cases ....
Id. at 165 n.67.
46. See generally, F. JAFFE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS 113-22 (1981) [here-
inafter cited as JAFFE].
47. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 188.020 (3) and (4) (Vernon 1975) (requiring spousal con-
sent, and in the case of unmarried minors, parental consent); KY. REV. STAT. § 311.740 (Supp.
1976) (requiring spousal consent). See generally Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post
Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (1974).
48. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), affdmem. sub nom., Gerstein v. Coe,
428 U.S. 901 (1976); Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974), modified, 541 F.2d
523 (6th Cir. 1976); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); Planned Parenthood Ass'n
v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See text accompanying notes 26-40 supra.
50. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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Supreme Court finally provided additional guidelines for abortion leg-
islation. Addressing several issues left unresolved in Roe and Doe, the
Court spoke for the first time on the constitutionality of parental and
spousal consent statutes.5" The Missouri parental consent statute52 re-
quired all unmarried minor women, without regard to age or maturity,
to obtain consent from their parents prior to obtaining an abortion. 53
The Court found that this blanket provision gave parents an absolute
veto power over a woman's abortion decision. 54 Invalidating the stat-
ute, the Court denounced the state's attempt to "give a third party an
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the (abortion) decision." 5"
The Court indicated that a state cannot delegate the power of absolute
veto to a third party when the state itself lacks this power. 56
The Danforth decision was an important step forward for the
rights of minors. It was the first explicit recognition that the right of
privacy is not reserved for adults alone. This decision did not mean,
however, that every minor "regardless of age or maturity" is capable of
giving effective consent; rather, it simply meant that a minor might be
mature and competent enough to give consent.57
The Court further delineated the abortion rights of minors in Bel-
lotti v. Baird.58 The challenged state law59 in Bellotti required a minor
seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of both parents. If one or
both parents refused consent, a state judge could authorize the abor-
51. Other provisions under attack in Danforth were the following: Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.050 (Vernon 1975) (prohibiting the abortion procedure by saline amniocentesis); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.020 (2) (Vernon 1975) (requiring the pregnant woman to give her informed consent);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 188.055 through 188.060 (Vernon 1975) (requiring physicians and health facil-
ities to record and report all abortions to the State of Missouri); and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.035
(Vernon 1975) (requiring the physician performing the abortion to exercise professional medical
care to preserve the life and health of the fetus).
The Court invalidated all these provisions except two. The informed consent requirement
was upheld because of the need for a woman to make the abortion decision with full knowledge of
its nature and consequences. The record-keeping provision was upheld as a reasonable measure
to preserve maternal health provided that adequate confidentiality is maintained.
52. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (4) (Vernon 1975).
53. Id. Missouri recognized the "mature minors" rule whereby a minor capable of under-
standing the medical procedure involved could give informed consent to surgery. Nonetheless,
the Missouri statute imposed a blanket parental consent requirement for abortions, failing to dif-
ferentiate between immature minors and those capable of making an intelligent, informed choice.
54. 428 U.S. at 75.
55. Id. at 74.
56. Id.
57. For an excellent discussion on the constitutionality of parental consent requirements see
Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy" Limitations on State Action After Danforth and Carey, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1216 (1977).
58. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). This case was originally argued before the Supreme Court on the
same day as Danforth in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). This earlier Bellot case was
remanded without decision for a state interpretation of the Massachusetts statute in question.
59. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979).
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tion. In an eight to one decision, the Court found the statute unconsti-
tutional. However, the majority was split in its reasoning. Justice
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehn-
quist, offered some guidelines as to how a state may constitutionally
provide for adult involvement in a minor's abortion decision. Accord-
ing to Justice Powell, a minor should be entitled to a proceeding which
allows her to demonstrate that she is mature enough to make the abor-
tion decision on her own. If she fails to do so, she must be permitted to
show that the abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests.
Only if she fails on both counts may the judge decline to allow the
operation. 60 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and
Blackmun, argued that a state may never condition a minor's right to
an abortion on a third party consent. 6'
Danforth also invalidated the Missouri spousal consent statute62
which required that a married woman obtain written consent from her
husband prior to obtaining an abortion. This provision applied in all
instances except when the abortion was necessary to preserve the wo-
man's life. The Court reasoned that a state cannot "delegate to a
spouse veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally pro-
hibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy." 63 The
Court thus reaffirmed the holding in Roe v. Wade that a state may not
interfere with a woman's fundamental right to decide to terminate her
pregnancy in the first trimester. 64 Moreover, since the state itself lacks
the authority to veto a woman's abortion decision in the first trimester,
it cannot grant this authority to a third party. In defense of the spousal
consent requirement, Missouri asserted that it had a sufficiently strong
state interest in protecting the integrity of marriage to justify the stat-
60. 443 U.S. at 647.
61. Justice White was the sole dissenter.
62. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (3) (Vernon 1975).
63. 428 U.S. at 69 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (1975)). For discussions
on spousal consent statutes see Note, Abortion Statutes After Danforth: An Examination, 15 J.
FAM. L. 536, 551-53 (1977); Comment, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth; Resolving the Antinomy,
4 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 425, 432-36 (1977); Note, Third Party Consent to Abortions Before and After
Danforth: A Theoretical Analysis, 15 J. FAM. L. 508 (1977).
64. As of this date, the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether a spousal
consent requirement can be imposed for abortions performed during the second trimester of preg-
nancy. Several lower court holdings, however, have indicated that the husband's consent as a
prerequisite to abortions in the second trimester would be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Wolfe v.
Schroering, 541 F.2d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 1976); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 697-98 (S.D. Fla.
1973).
The rationale of Danforth suggests that there would be no constitutional basis for upholding a
spousal consent statute in the second trimester. The question as to whether spousal consent may
be required for an abortion during the third trimester has apparently never been litigated as most
states continue to proscribe nontherapeutic abortions during this period of pregnancy.
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ute. 65 The Court rejected this argument, expressing doubt that giving a
husband unilateral veto power over his wife's decision to abort would
promote family ties.66
Notification Requirements
The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade has been vigorously
contested and criticized since 1973. Today, a decade after the decision,
the abortion controversy shows no signs of abating. In fact, the inten-
sity over the abortion debate has increased in recent years as anti-abor-
tion forces relentlessly campaign against women's right to choose
abortion, while abortion rights advocates continue to oppose any at-
tempts to overturn the 1973 decision.67 After 1976, when the Court in-
validated spousal and parental consent requirements, several states
enacted laws requiring women to notify their husbands or parents of
their decision to obtain an abortion.68
The constitutionality of a Utah state law69 requiring a minor to
notify her parents prior to terminating her pregnancy was recently ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court in H.L v. Matheson.7° In a six to three
decision, the Court held that Utah's parental notification statute was
constitutional as applied to an unemancipated minor living with and
dependent upon her parents. In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice
Burger's majority opinion emphasized the important rights of parents
in bringing up their children. Noting that the statute did not provide
for a veto over the minor's decision to abort, the Court balanced the
interests served by the statute against the burden imposed on the mi-
nor. The majority identified preservation of family integrity and pro-
tection of adolescents as important state interests which, although
insufficient to warrant a consent statute such as the one involved in
Danforth, justified parental notification requirements. 7'
Unlike Danforth, the Matheson decision is limited to immature or
unemancipated minors dependent on and living with their parents.
65. 428 U.S. at 68. This argument was used by the State of Florida and upheld by the Fifth
Circuit in justifying spousal notice requirements in Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.
1981). See infra, text accompanying notes 98-111.
66. 428 U.S. at 71.
67. See National NOW Times, March 1983, at 1 col. 4. See also JAFFE, supra note 46, at 113-
22.
68. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305(2) (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1978);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35 (West 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(a) and (4)(b) (West
1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-23.4 (1982).
69. UTAH CODE ANN. 76-7-304(2) (1974).
70. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
71. Id. at 411-13.
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The Court specifically refused to rule on the constitutionality of the
parental notification statute as applied to mature minors, saying: "We
cannot assume that the statute when challenged in a proper case, will
not be construed . . . to exempt demonstrably mature minors. '"72 Jus-
tice Powell's concurrence, joined by Justice Stewart, emphasized that
he joined the majority only with the understanding that the ruling did
not apply to mature minors or to those whose best interests would not
be served by notification. 73 In light of the Court's emphasis on the role
of the parent-child relationship as an important factor in upholding
parental notification and the intimation that the Utah statute would be
unconstitutional if applied to emancipated minors, the Matheson deci-
sion appears to have little bearing on the issue of spousal notification.
Rather, the case seems to signal a warning to state legislatures that an
exception should be provided for minors who demonstrate a capability
of making an informed decision (and for minors whose best interests
would not be served by notifying the parents).
The underlying issue in the spousal notification controversy is
whether there is any justification for statutory recognition of the hus-
band's interest in his wife's abortion.74 Although the protection of both
the wife's as well as the husband's interests in procreation would be
desirable, 75 the Supreme Court has made it clear that a husband's in-
terests may not be protected at the expense of stifling the wife's rights.76
Thus, if notifying the husband of his wife's abortion would create an
overbearing burden upon the woman, it is questionable whether. a state
may constitutionally require notification on behalf of the husband.
There has never been a constitutional recognition of the husband's
72. Id. at 406. The Court also pointed out that the United States District Court for Utah had
held the statute inapplicable to emancipated minors. As there has been no appeal on that issue,
this holding of the district court was controlling on the state. Id.
73. Id. at 413-14. Only Justice Stevens found that the statute was constitutional as applied to
all minors, regardless of age or maturity. Id. at 424-25.
74. The husband's interest in the fetus was not recognized at common law. See Note, Abor-
tion: The Father's Rights, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 441 (1973). Consequently, the basis for interference
with the wife's abortion decision on behalf of the husband cannot be his interest in the fetus.
75. Some courts have recognized a valid state interest in protecting the husband's procreative
rights. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), af'dmem sub nom., Gerstein v.
Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976). In Poe, the Fifth Circuit suggested that abortion should be made
grounds for divorce as a means of protecting the husband's interests without violating the wife's
right to choose an abortion. The court referred to Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d
800 (1942), in which a woman was granted a divorce on the grounds of her husband's repeated
refusals to participate in sexual intercourse without the use of contraceptives. See also Note, A
Spouse's Right to Marital Dissolution Predicated on the Partner's Contraceptive Surgery, 23
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 99 (1977); Note, Abortion and the Husband's Consent, 13 J. FAM. L. 311
(1974).
76. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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right to be notified of his wife's decision to abort. Sheinberg v. Smith 77
is a case of first impression on this issue.
SCHEINBERG V. SMITH
Statement of the Case
Dr. Mark Scheinberg, a licensed physician in the State of Florida,
brought a class action 78 against Florida's state enforcement officials. 79
The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Florida statute8o
which regulated the termination of pregnancies. He sought a declara-
tory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and re-
quested preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the
defendants from prosecuting him or members of his class for alleged
violations of the statute.
Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of subsec-
tions (4)(a)81 and (4)(b) 82 of the statute. Subsection (4)(a) of the statute
required an unmarried minor seeking an abortion to provide her physi-
cian with either the written consent of a parent, custodian or legal
guardian or an order from the circuit court authorizing abortion. Sub-
section (4)(b) required the physician to ensure that a married woman
seeking an abortion notify her husband of the proposed abortion and
allow him the opportunity to consult with her concerning the proce-
dure. This provision did not apply if the husband and wife were sepa-
rated or estranged.
Lower Court Holdings
A preliminary hearing was held in July 1979 to consider the plain-
tiffs request for a preliminary injunction.83 At this hearing, the district
77. 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981).
78. The classes included: 1) all unmarried minor pregnant women desiring abortions, and
their physicians; and 2) all married pregnant women desiring abortions, and their physicians.
Jones v. Smith, 474 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
79. The named defendants were James C. Smith and Michael J. Satz, the Attorney General
of Florida and the State Attorney for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida respectively. See
Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529, 531 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(a) and (4)(b) (West 1981). This statute was previously
codified as the Medical Practice Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.505(4)(a) and (4)(b) (West 1979).
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(a) (West 1981) (Previously codified as FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.505(4)(a) (West 1979)).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(b) (West 1981) (previously codified as FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.505(4)(b) (West 1979)).
83. Jones v. Smith, 474 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1979). The suit was originally filed by
plaintiff under a pseudonym: John Jones, M.D. Upon plaintiffs request the court amended the
captioning of the case to reflect his true name, Mark Scheinberg, M.D. See Scheinberg v. Smith,
482 F. Supp. 529, 531 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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court, relying on Belloti v. Baird,84 enjoined the state from prosecuting
plaintiff or any member of the class he represented under the statutory
provision requiring minors to obtain parental consent. 85 In Bellotti, the
Supreme Court had held that a judge cannot determine that abortion is
not in the best interest of a minor if the minor has been adjudged ma-
ture enough to make an informed decision on her own.8 6 The district
court found that the language of subsection (4)(a) empowered a judge
to do precisely what the Bellott decision prohibited; that is, it allowed a
judicial veto power over a minor's abortion decision. Accordingly, the
court granted a preliminary injunction as to that provision of the Flor-
ida statute.87  The same relief, however, was denied for subsection
(4)(b) as the court found that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a sub-
stantial likelihood that the spousal notification requirement would be
found unconstitutional on the merits.88
At the final hearing, the district court found that the spousal notice
and consultation provision of the statute imposed a substantial interfer-
ence upon a woman's decision to obtain an abortion in the first trimes-
ter of pregnancy. 89 The court found the asserted state interests 90
insufficient to justify the intrusion imposed by this notice require-
ment. 9' Accordingly, this regulation also was invalidated. 92
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding on the provision regulating a minor's access
84. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
85. Jones v. Smith, 474 F. Supp. 1160, 1167 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
86. 443 U.S. at 647. See supra, text accompanying notes 59-61.
87. Jones v. Smith, 474 F. Supp. at 1167. At the final hearing, the district court first consid-
ered whether in light of the doctrine enunciated in R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941), abstention was appropriate for subsection (4)(a). In Pullman, the Supreme Court articu-
lated a theory of abstention. Abstention comes into play where an unclear or unconstrued state
law, which is susceptible to an interpretation that would render it constitutional, is challenged on
federal constitutional grounds. In such cases, deference is given to state courts to interpret the
unsettled state law, thereby avoiding the possibility of unnecessarily deciding a federal constitu-
tional question. Id. at 500. Under the Pullman doctrine, the usual course adopted by the federal
court is to retain jurisdiction over the case, but stay the federal suit until the state law questions
are decided by the state court. See Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88
(1975). In the Scheinberg case, since no possible ambiguity existed in the interpretation of§ (4)(a),
the court found that the Pullman abstention was not warranted. 482 F. Supp. at 535.
88. Jones v. Smith, 474 F. Supp. at 1167.
89. Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529, 538 (S.D. Fla. 1979). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), the Supreme Court held that no governmental interference is permissible in a woman's
decision to obtain an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy. See supra, text accompanying
notes 32-37.
90. The State of Florida asserted two compelling interests to justify requiring spousal notifi-
cation: 1) promoting marital relationships, and 2) protecting the husband's interest in the procrea-
tive potential of the marriage. 482 F. Supp. at 538-39.
91. Id. at 539.
92. Id. at 540.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
to abortion.93 It vacated and remanded the holding on the spousal no-
tification provision for specific findings as to the effect of a properly
performed abortion procedure upon a woman's child-bearing capac-
ity.94 If the Florida legislature could have reasonably concluded that
such abortions create a greater than de minimis risk to a woman's child-
bearing capacity, the spousal notice provision was to be upheld. 95
Reasoning of the Court
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the State of Florida admitted that
the parental consent requirement in subsection (4)(a) could not with-
stand constitutional attack in light of Bellotti v. Baird.96 The court then
focused on the spousal notice and consultation requirement set forth in
subsection (4)(b). 97 It agreed with the district court's findings that this
provision created a substantial interference with a woman's abortion
decision98 so that it could be justified only by compelling state inter-
ests.99 The State of Florida asserted two compelling interests: promot-
ing the marital relationship and protecting the husband's interest in the
procreative potential of the marriage. 00 Unlike the district court,' 0 '
the Scheinberg court found that the two interests, weighed together,
"telescoped into a state interest" in furthering the integrity of marriage
93. Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 487 (5th Cir. 1981).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). See supra, notes 58-61 and accompanying text. The State of Florida
argued, however, that the district court should have abstained or certified the question of the
parental consent requirement to the state court for proper interpretation of the statute. 659 F.2d at
480. After determining that no possible ambiguity existed in the interpretation of subsection
(4)(a), the Scheinberg court found that neither abstention nor certification was proper in this case.
Id. at 481. See supra, note 87 for a discussion on the doctrine of abstention relied on by the State
of Florida.
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(b) (West 1981) provides:
(b) If the woman is married, the husband shall be given notice of the proposed
termination of pregnancy and an opportunity to consult with the wife concerning the
procedure. The physician may rely on a written statement of the wife that such notice
and opportunity has been given, or he may rely on the written consent of the husband to
the proposed termination of pregnancy. If the husband and wife are separated or es-
tranged, the provisions of this paragraph for notice or consent shall not be required. The
physician may rely upon a written statement from the wife that the husband is volunta-
rily living apart or estranged from her.
98. 659 F.2d at 482. In arriving at this conclusion the court relied on Charles v. Carey, 627
F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
stated that when a fundamental right is subjected to regulation a plaintiff need only show "inter-
ference [that] is sufficiently substantial and not de minimis." Id. at 777.
99. See supra, text accompanying notes 26-31.
100. 659 F.2d at 483.
101. The district court had rejected both the interests asserted by the state as insufficient to
justify interference with a woman's abortion decision in the first trimester of pregnancy.
Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529, 539-40 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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and family and were sufficient to justify the burden imposed upon a
woman by the spousal notification statute. 0 2
The Scheinberg court reasoned that regulation of marriage has
long been considered a matter of state concern.103 The court relied on
several Supreme Court cases' °4 in which the state's broad regulatory
powers over several aspects of marriage had been noted, and found
that the State of Florida had a valid interest in strengthening the state-
created and regulated institution of marriage by fostering the mutuality
of decisions between a husband and wife. 0 5
Similarly, the court found that the state had a substantial interest
in protecting the husband's interest in the procreative potential of his
marriage. 0 6 Relying on Skinner v. Oklahoma,'07 the court stated that
the husband's procreative rights are entitled to constitutional protec-
tion. 0 8  Without the protection afforded the husband via the spousal
notification statute, the husband's procreative interests could be
secretly frustrated by his wife without his ever discovering it. 109 Thus,
although the state's interest in protecting the husband's procreative po-
tential has been found to be insufficiently compelling to justify a
spousal consent requirement, 10 the Scheinberg court held that it is suf-
ficient to justify the lesser intrusion imposed by the spousal notification
requirement." '
Next, the court inquired whether the statute was narrowly drafted
to further only the state's interests at stake. 12 The court rejected the
district court's reasoning that the spousal notification statute was not
drafted in a constitutionally acceptable manner.1 3 According to the
court, the fact that the state required the husband to be notified of his
wife's abortion decision without requiring the same for other medical
102. 659 F.2d at 483.
103. Id at 483-84.
104. The court cited Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532
(1971); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), as support for
state regulations of the institution of marriage.
105. 659 F.2d at 483-84.
106. Id. at 485.
107. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Skinner involved an Oklahoma statute that allowed compulsory
sterilization of certain convicted criminals. See supra, text accompanying notes 43-44.
108. 659 F.2d at 485.
109. Id.
110. See Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), aft'dmem sub nom., Gerstein v. Coe,
428 U.S. 901 (1976).
111. 659 F.2d at 485.
112. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court articulated a two-part test
which the state is required to meet in order to justify statutory intrusions into the right of privacy.
See supra, text accompanying notes 27-31.
113. 659 F.2d at 486.
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procedures which would affect the wife's procreative abilities was not
significant. Similarly, the fact that the statute did not distinguish be-
tween the married woman's husband and the father of the child did not
make it over-inclusive. ' 14 In light of the fact that the state's interest
was in preserving the marital relationship and the procreative potential
of the marriage, rather than in protecting the father's rights in the fetus,
the court found the issue of paternity to be peripheral. ' 5
Because the Scheinberg court's primary justification for the
spousal notification statute was the state's interest in protecting the pro-
creative potential of the marriage, it was necessary to determine the
effects of abortion procedures on a woman's ability to bear children in
the future. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for specific find-
ings to that effect," 6 holding that if the findings indicate that abortions
have the potential to affect a woman's future procreative abilities ad-
versely, the state may require notification to the husband.
On remand, United States District Judge Sidney Aronovitz held
that an abortion, performed properly by licensed medical practitioners
in accordance with procedures approved by prevailing medical authori-
ties, does not pose a greater than de minimis risk to a woman's procrea-
tive abilities. Accordingly, Judge Aronovitz held subsection (4)(b) to
be unconstitutional."17
Analysis of the Opinion
Scheinberg is the first case to address the constitutionality of a
state statute requiring that a woman notify her husband prior to ob-
taining an abortion." t8 Having accepted at the outset that this require-
ment created "an obstacle, hitherto nonexistent" to a woman's ability
114. Id.
115. The court explained:
The question is not whether notice should be required if a husband is not the father of
the fetus, but rather whether the abortion procedure poses a substantial enough risk of a
decrease in fertility to affect detrimentally, e.g., in more than a de minimis fashion, the
procreative potential of a marriage.
Id.
116. At the trial the parties had presented conflicting evidence concerning the degree of risk an
abortion posed to the procreative potential of a marriage. Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. at
539.
117. Scheinberg v. Smith, 550 F. Supp. 1112, 1116 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
118. Some federal courts, although faced with this issue, have not addressed the constitution-
ality of spousal notice and consultation statutes. See, e.g., Roe v. Rampton, 535 F.2d 1219 (10th
Cir. 1976) (court found that abstention was proper and remanded the issue to the state court to
interpret the statute in question); Doe v. Deschamps, 461 F. Supp. 682 (D. Mont. 1976) (the statute
as written was unconstitutional because it provided no method of giving notice whereby a physi-
cian would know how to avoid criminal liability).
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to procure an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy, 19 the court's
discussion concentrated primarily on the compelling interests asserted
by the state. The court held that the state's interests in promoting mari-
tal relationships and protecting the husband's procreative potential in
the marriage are sufficiently compelling to justify the burden imposed
by the spousal notification statute.
120
In reaching this decision, however, the Scheinberg court com-
pletely ignored the mandate of Roe v. Wade,' 21 in which the Supreme
Court held that state regulations burdening a woman's decision to ob-
tain an abortion in the first trimester are unconstitutional.1
22
In subsequent cases, such as Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth123 and Connecticut v. Menilo,124 the Supreme Court
did uphold some state regulation over first trimester abortions. How-
ever, it did so only on the grounds that the regulation was not overly
burdensome and was related to maternal health. For example, in Dan-
forth, the Court found that the Missouri state law requiring the physi-
cian to obtain the woman's informed consent prior to abortion was
reasonable and not overly burdensome. The Danforth Court also
found the record keeping provision, requiring physicians and health
facilities to record and report all abortions to the state of Missouri to be
a reasonable measure to protect maternal health, provided adequate
confidentiality was maintained. 125 Similarly, in Menillo the Court up-
held a state law prohibiting nonphysicians from performing abortions,
finding such a regulation to be nonoverbearing and reasonably related
to preserving maternal health. In fact, as early as 1973, in Doe v. Bol-
ton,'12 6 the Court recognized the need for some reasonable health-re-
lated state regulation for abortions. 127
'These cases do not demonstrate a retreat from the holding in Roe.
Rather, they establish that state regulations that are not overbearing
upon a woman's abortion decision need only have a rational relation-
ship to the asserted state interest. The rational basis test is used when
the litigant fails to show that the state law interfered with a fundamen-
119. 659 F.2d at 483.
120. Id.
121. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122. See supra, text accompanying notes 26-37.
123. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
124. 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
125. See supra, note 51.
126. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
127. See supra, note 34.
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tal right. 128 Under this standard of review, there is a presumption of
validity in favor of the state law. As long as the regulation is rational, it
is to be upheld and the state need not justify it by showing that it pro-
tects a compelling state interest.129 If, on the other hand, the regulation
is found to burden a woman's abortion decision, the state must show a
compelling interest; no compelling interest, however, exists in the first
trimester of pregnancy.130 Nonetheless, the Scheinberg court reached
the conclusion that the interests asserted by the State of Florida were
indeed compelling in the first trimester of a married woman's
pregnancy. 131
This conclusion by the Scheinberg court is particularly difficult to
understand in light of Doe v. Bolton. 132 In Doe, the Supreme Court
invalidated health-related regulations because they were found unduly
burdensome. 133 Though a legitimate state interest in preserving mater-
nal health exists throughout the entire phase of pregnancy, 134 the courts
have consistently held that regulations which apply to first trimester
abortions must not be overbearing. 135
The Scheinberg court's justification for finding the state's interests
compelling rests on the balancing of the interests at stake.' 36 In certain
recent cases, the Supreme Court does appear to have used a balancing
approach to substantive due process review. 137 Under the balancing
128. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).
129. Compare this approach to the strict scrutiny applied to state legislation when the litigant
is able to show that the legislation impinges upon a fundamental right. See supra, notes 26-31 and
accompanying text.
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra, text accompanying notes 32-37.
131. 659 F.2d at 483.
132. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
133. See supra, notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
134. In Roe, the Court recognized that the state had a legitimate interest in the health of the
mother. This interest became compelling, however, only after the first trimester of pregnancy. Id.
at 162-63.
135. See, e.g., Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980) (the court invalidated sections of
the informed consent statute requiring a woman to view pictures of a fetus at various stages of
gestational development and requiring that she be told of the possibility of organic pain to the
fetus); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D.
Mo. 1980) (informed consent provision requiring physician to tell every patient about the anatom-
ical and physiological characteristics of a fetus were found an impermissible intrusion into the
privacy of the doctor-patient relationship, depriving the woman of the right to consult freely with
her physician).
136. 659 F.2d at 485. The court stated:
In essence, therefore, the spousal notice provision is a statutory burden on a wo-
man's abortion decision that, in the final analysis, takes less from a woman's untrammel-
led right to secure an abortion than it adds to the protection of the integrity and dignity
of family life.
Id. (footnote omitted).
137. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411-13 (1981); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
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approach, the court weighs the degree of interference the state regula-
tion imposes on the right against the asserted governmental interest.
As the interference with the protected right diminishes, it may be out-
weighed by governmental interests of lesser importance. However,
even if it used such a balancing approach, the Scheinberg court's ra-
tionale still must fail. In deciding that the state's interests outweighed
the degree of burden imposed upon the woman by the notification stat-
ute,1 38 the court necessarily made two assumptions. First, the court au-
tomatically concluded that the spousal notification statute furthers the
integrity of marital relationships. 139 The only support provided for this
conclusion was the district court's finding that mutual communication
between a married couple is considered by experts to promote marital
harmony.t40 However, there is no indication from the testimony heard
by the district court' 4' that a state law forcing a woman to notify her
husband of her abortion decision strengthens marital relationships. On
the contrary, the district court cited specific instances in which forcing a
woman to notify her husband of her decision to abort would harm
rather than benefit the marriage. 142 Moreover, in Planned Parenthood
of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 43 the Supreme Court found that re-
quiring the husband's consent prior to an abortion did not further the
state's interests in promoting marital harmony. 44 The Scheinberg
court failed to explain how this state interest is served any better by
forcing a woman to notify her husband of her decision.
The second assumption made by the Scheinberg court was that the
spousal notification statute imposed a lesser degree of burden than did
374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). But see Shore, Marital Secrets-The Emerging Issue of
Abortion Spousal Notfication Laws, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 461, 474-78 (1982) in which the author
contends that the Supreme Court follows the strict scrutiny test without balancing.
138. 659 F.2d at 485.
139. The court found it apparent "that notice and consultation does, in general, further the
integrity of marital and familial life." Id. at 484 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. (quoting Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. at 537).
141. Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. at 537.
142. The testimony of experts in the areas of psychiatry, gynecology, psychology and obstet-
rics as well as that of social workers and counselors indicated that in certain instances, the require-
ment of compulsory notification would, at least, produce anxiety and stress for the woman and her
marriage. Some specific instances where forcing a woman to communicate her decision to her
husband would produce adverse effects were: 1) where the husband is not the father of the fetus;
2) where the wife has been a rape victim and does not wish to disclose that fact; 3) where the
husband's strong religious or moral precepts would object to abortion; 4) where the husband is
emotionally or physically unstable and incapable of participating in the decision; and 5) where the
woman fears physical abuse from her husband. Id. at 538.
143. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
144. Id. at 69. The Danforth Court did not approach the issue of whether the state interest in
promoting marital relationship was compelling; instead it rejected the state interest because it
found it would be unlikely to be furthered by the spousal consent requirement.
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the spousal consent statute involved in Danforth. 45 In an effort to dis-
tinguish this case from Danforth, the Scheinberg court stated that the
Florida statute "does not run afoul of the concerns emphasized in Dan-
forth" because it requires notice rather than consent. 146 However, as
the district court noted, there are several instances in which a compul-
sory requirement that forces a woman to notify her husband of her
decision will create substantial obstacles in the woman's path. 47 For
many women the consequences of notifying their husbands of their de-
cision could include physical or emotional abuse and withdrawal of
financial support. 148 In order to avoid such consequences, many wo-
men may seek other alternatives such as obtaining an illegal abortion.
Also, some women may delay the decision to get an abortion past the
first trimester of pregnancy after which the dangers of abortion begin to
increase. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that many women when forced
to notify their husbands may forego the decision to obtain an abortion
altogether. Thus, especially in the face of the evidence presented by
experts at trial, 149 it is indeed naive to believe that, for many women,
notifying their husbands of their decision to abort would not amount to
the same degree of interference as that imposed by a spousal consent
statute.
The Scheinberg court relied on Skinner v. Oklahoma150 to reach
the conclusion that the state has a compelling interest in requiring a
wife to inform her husband of her abortion decision. 5 ' In Skinner, the
Supreme Court struck down a state law providing for compulsory ster-
ilization of certain convicts, stating that the right of procreation is fun-
damental. 52 Skinner appears to protect the right to procreate only
against state interference; it does not guarantee a procreative opportu-
nity. The Scheinberg court took the Skinner rationale a step further by
145. 659 F.2d at 485.
146. Id.
147. See supra, note 142.
148. In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), Justice Marshall's dissent noted the adverse
effects that a parental notice statute could pose:
In addition to parental disappointment and disapproval, the minor may confront physi-
cal or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support, or actual obstruction of the
abortion decision. Furthermore, the threat of parental notice may cause some minor
women to delay past the first trimester of pregnancy, after which the health risks increase
significantly. Other pregnant minors may attempt to self-abort or to obtain an illegal
abortion rather than risk parental notification.
Id. at 438-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Similar problems face a woman in notifying her husband
under certain situations.
149. 1d.
150. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
151. 659 F.2d at 485.
152. See supra, text accompanying notes 43-44.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
holding that a state may take affirmative steps in order to protect an
individual's procreative rights. It is not at all clear from Skinner, how-
ever, that protecting a husband's procreative interests would justify en-
croaching upon his wife's conflicting right to choose an abortion
without state intrusion during the first trimester of pregnancy.
This askew reading of Skinner is particularly incomprehensible in
light of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Poe v. Gerstein,153 in which the
same court found that Skinner does not guarantee the husband a will-
ing partner, but merely protects procreative rights against state intru-
sions. 154 Moreover, in Danforth, the Supreme Court explicitly stated
that the interests of the husband in the abortion decision are
subordinate to those of the wife. ' 5 5 Yet, the Scheinberg court construed
Skinner as authority to elevate the husband's procreative rights to a
level where the state may be authorized, on the husband's behalf, to
interfere with the woman's abortion decision.
Once the state's interest in limiting a fundamental right is deemed
compelling, the state must nonetheless demonstrate that the challenged
state law is necessary to fulfill that interest. 156 The Supreme Court in
Roe stated that "legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake."' 57 As the district
court in Scheinberg observed, the notification statute is grossly underin-
clusive to meet this standard articulated in Roe. 58 For example, the
State of Florida does not require a woman to notify or consult with her
husband prior to other surgical procedures, such as hysterectomy,
which would totally foreclose marital procreative potential. 59 Conse-
153. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975), afl'dmem. sub nom., Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
154. 517 F.2d at 797. In Poe, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a Florida statute which required
that a physician obtain the consent of a married woman's husband prior to performing an abor-
tion. The court found that the asserted state interest of protecting the father's procreative poten-
tial was not served by the consent requirement. Id.
155. 428 U.S. at 71. The Court stated:
The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disagree on (the abortion) deci-
sion, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Since it is the wo-
man who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately
affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.
Id.
156. See supra, text accompanying note 31.
157. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), in which the state asserted that its interest in promoting marital
relationships justified a spousal consent requirement. The Court rejected this assertion upon the
theory that the statute did not further the asserted state interest. Therefore, the unarticulated
theory in Danforth seems to be that a statute must be necessary to achieve the state interest at
stake.
158. 482 F. Supp. at 540.
159. Id.
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quently, any assertion that the notification statute is necessary to pro-
tect the marital procreative potential is greatly undermined.
The Scheinberg court's cursory treatment of this issue indicates the
court's apparent failure to recognize the basic question of whether the
notification statute is necessary to achieve the asserted state interests.
Relying on Danforth, the court simply observed that "a state may sin-
gle out abortion for special legislative regulation because of its unique
character and profound ramifications."' 160
Public Policy Considerations
Some troubling impacts are foreseeable from the Scheinberg rul-
ing. The distress caused by a possible exposure to an adverse reaction
of a husband may compel a woman to choose a less desirable alterna-
tive to abortion rather than to notify her husband. As was true prior to
Roe v. Wade, many women may subject themselves to illegal abortions
"fraught with the myriad possibilities of mutilation, infection, sterility
and death."'16 1 Furthermore, as the testimony presented at trial indi-
cates, for a woman confronted with the possibilities of physical or emo-
tional abuse by her husband, a notification requirement could pose a
major obstacle in her ability to effectuate her decision to obtain an
abortion. Finally, if the Scheinberg court upholds the notice statute,
the result will be to allow the interjection of a third party into the pa-
tient-physician conference held to be private in Roe v. Wade. This may
affect the right of a woman and her attending physician to make an
unfettered abortion decision through private consultation. 62
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit's decision is disturbing as it undermines the fun-
damental right of a woman, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Roe
v. Wade, to make an abortion decision free of undue state interference.
The court's holding that the state's interests in promoting marital rela-
tions and protecting the procreative potential of the marriage are suffi-
ciently compelling to justify a spousal notice requirement defies
Supreme Court rulings in Roe v. Wade and its progeny. The court fails
to take into account the intrusive nature of the statute or consider
whether the state interests are furthered by it. Had the court found that
the notice statute does not impose a substantial burden upon the wo-
160. 659 F.2d at 486.
161. YWCA of Princeton, N.J. v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048, 1074 (D.N.J. 1972).
162. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154.
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man, thereby requiring merely a rational relationship between the stat-
ute and the asserted state interests, the court's reasoning would perhaps
have been more sound. Having accepted the substantial nature of the
burden imposed by the notification requirement, the court was not jus-
tified in upholding the interest asserted as compelling by the State of
Florida.
In the final analysis, spousal notification should be regarded as a
private judgment. In the absence of any consensus that spousal notifi-
cation is beneficial, legislation mandating such notification should not
override a woman's judgment.

